Tahnee Thantrong Monnin analyzes a textual difference between §§ 3604(a) and (f) of the Fair Housing Act and concludes, based on a line of cases extending the Fair Housing Act's protections to residents of homeless shelters, "that third-party consideration is and should be sufficient for purposes of applying §§ 3604(a) and (f)."
Tag: statutory interpretation
Erin Yonchak, writing on stealthing and on rape exceptions to state abortion bans, concludes that, first, "[c]urrent rape law does not capture a swath of sexual violence, like stealthing—and rape exceptions, as written, do little to provide options for those victims," and second, "if providing abortion access to sexual violence survivors is a priority for legislators in abortion-restricted states, rape exceptions should be broadened to expansively define 'rape' as any unwanted sexual conduct and divorce rape exceptions from the criminal system, which remains an inadequate mechanism for victims of sexual violence."
Analyzing the First Circuit's opinion in Moore v. British Airways PLC, Kelsey Roberts suggests that when "courts determine whether there was an accident" under the Montreal Convention, they should do so from "the airline’s perspective, as measured by airline policies and industry standards."
Josh J. Leopold examines "two divergent causation standards endorsed by courts in [False Claims Act] claims predicated on [Anti-Kickback Statute] violations," ultimately concluding that a "but-for causation standard should be disfavored by courts in these cases."